Will Taiwan Survive the Next Four Years?
And the Perils of "Authoritarian Peace"
It is increasingly clear that Trump views many of our democratic allies with disdain. He considers them free riders under the American national security umbrella and does not appreciate the value of our alliance system, of shared history, or of democracy itself. And as the infamous Ukraine tweet shows, he is more than willing to “blame the victim” and parrot the talking points of his authoritarian colleagues.
It may be the case that Trump is trying to wind things down in Ukraine in order to focus U.S. military resources on China, which has been a core argument of many of his advisors, notably Elbridge Colby (who has still yet to be confirmed). More boldly, we may be witnessing what some have referred to as a “reverse Nixon”— where the U.S. tries to peel off Russia in order to counter a rising China. There may be some method to this madness, or at least some people in the White House who have something resembling a plan.
The other interpretation is that some grand “authoritarian realignment” is afoot, where Trump sells out our democratic allies and cozies up to both Russia and China, or at least turns down the heat. In the short run, this sort of “authoritarian peace” may bring some degree of global stability, but at the expense of our values, democracy, and the political freedoms of people in Ukraine, Taiwan, and places like them.
Either way, the fate of Taiwan hangs in the balance, and I’m growing increasingly pessimistic that Taiwan as we know it will survive the next four years. This post provides a short primer on Taiwan, why it matters, and some possible scenarios moving forward.
Taiwan: A Very Short Primer
Taiwan continued existence requires one of the most delicate balancing acts in American foreign policymaking. Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China have been two separate political entities since 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT fled to Taiwan on the brink of military defeat, and the CCP established the People’s Republic of China in the mainland. At the time, the KMT enjoyed the backing of the United States, which refused to extend diplomatic recognition to Beijing, instead recognizing the “Republic of China” in Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. This was eventually reversed in 1979, when the U.S. agreed to recognize the People’s Republic of China as “the sole legal Government of China.” As part of the 1979 Joint Communique, the U.S. would maintain “cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan,” a compromise which the PRC had no choice but to accept given its relatively weak position in the international system.
The unofficial nature of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship meant that from the outset, interactions between the two governments were quite complicated and governed by unique protocols. The U.S. does not have a formal embassy in Taiwan, but maintains the “American Institute in Taiwan” (AIT), a nonprofit that fills the embassy function. Communication between Taiwan and the U.S. occurs through a dense network of lower level officials, rather than direct presidential contact. Trade ties and military ties between Taiwan and the U.S. remain quite rich, and Taiwan fills an important role in the global supply chain given its advanced semiconductor industry.
In the decades after losing recognition, Taiwan transitioned from a repressive dictatorship into a vibrant, multiparty democracy, the sort of peaceful regime change many have hoped would unfold in China. Taiwan continued to lose stature in the international system, as more and more countries recognized the PRC, and Taiwan became excluded from many international institutions. Within Taiwan, politics are largely centered around cross-strait relations, with the KMT favoring closer relations with Beijing, and the newly formed Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leaning more towards independence. Increasingly Taiwanese do not view themselves as Chinese, and the DPP has been in power since 2016 because of this, to the constant consternation of Beijing.
Thus, the PRC (mainland), ROC (Taiwan) and the U.S. have been in a complicated triangle for decades now. Taiwan is now effectively a country that cannot be widely recognized as such, given the official position of the PRC that Taiwan is a renegade province and there is only “one China.” China is increasingly forcing other countries to parrot this language on Taiwan. For its part, the U.S. government has developed very careful language about how to talk about Taiwan, dictated by a series of policy documents from the 1970s and 1980s, notably the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The Biden administration summarized the basics of the U.S. position in November 2023 as follows:
We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side. We do not support Taiwan independence. We support cross-Strait dialogue, and we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner that is acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait. We do not take a position on the ultimate resolution of cross-Strait differences, provided they are resolved peacefully.
The U.S. opposes unilateral change to the status quo and does not pursue a “One China, One Taiwan” type policy. There is also “strategic ambiguity” about whether the U.S. would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in the case of a Chinese invasion. In its own wargaming, China’s People’s Liberation Army tends to assume the U.S. would intervene, or at least they have historically. China’s entire military apparatus is being built for such a scenario, and as the military balance of power shifts, it will take more and more military investment from both Taiwan and the U.S. to deter an invasion. It’s clear that Taiwan remains a priority for the CCP and for Xi Jinping personally, and the mainland has grown increasingly bellicose in the last few years given the electoral successes of the DPP.
In my opinion, the best we can hope for Taiwan is the continuation of the status quo. While many Taiwanese and their politicians yearn for formal diplomatic recognition as a country of their own, there is no world where Beijing would allow this to happen, and any strong moves in that direction would likely beget war and an invasion in short order. I consider myself a supporter of Taiwan, but I do not support Taiwanese independence for this reason. Saying that out loud means running the risk of being seen as pro-China or an “appeaser” or something like that. But it really the only pragmatic position, and most American China experts I know hold some version of that view. This is also the official position of the U.S. government, for now at least.
Why is Taiwan worth standing up for? Among the American national security establishment, the standard argument is that Taiwan is critical for demonstrating American resolve in the region, and losing Taiwan would embolden Beijing and encourage further expansionist adventures. Taiwan is part of what’s known as the “first island chain” which includes Japan and the Philippines, and gaining Taiwan would put the PRC in closer proximity to those countries and could provide a base of operations.
I have never really bought the expansionist argument—I think the CCP’s primary focus is domestic stability, and they view Taiwan as a domestic issue. I don’t think China’s plan is to take Taiwan, and then in turn try to take on the Philippines and Japan and embark on a campaign of regional military domination. For me, Taiwan is more of a moral issue than a national security one. Taiwan is an ally, a vibrant beacon of democracy in Asia, and it is being threatened with invasion by an emerging authoritarian great power. We should use American power to stand up for our values and for democracy, as we did initially after Russia invaded Ukraine.
How This Goes Wrong
The continued existence of Taiwan requires extremely careful, thoughtful policymaking on the part of the U.S. government. These are not qualities the Trump administration has in abundance. On the one hand, Taiwan needs support, both morally and militarily, and American leaders need to continue to signal that and ensure that Taiwan has the means to defend itself. On the other hand, we also need to reassure Beijing that the U.S. does not support Taiwanese independence and is not taking tangible steps to move things in that direction.
This means there are basically two separate ways that this goes wrong. The first is that Republican policymakers get reckless and provoke a war (which they will in turn blame China for). I have always been concerned that in their zeal to demonstrate their “tough on China” credentials, American politicians will hug Taiwan to death. A number of Congresspeople recently introduced a bill that would extend diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, which might sound like a nice thing to do, but it’s something Beijing could not abide. If this bill becomes law, it could easily start a war. We are also seeing some signs of policy shifts elsewhere in the U.S. government—the State Department recently removed language from a fact sheet that said it does not support Taiwanese independence. These types of moves may look “tough,” but they are ill-conceived and unnecessary.
The second way this turns south is that Trump signals to Xi that he doesn’t plan to defend Taiwan. He has already hinted publicly that he views Taiwan in much the same way he views Ukraine—a weak nuisance that gives nothing back to the United States. He has said repeatedly that he believes Taiwan “stole our chip business” and has threatened tariffs, as he has for most of our other allies. He seems completely comfortable working with, and even siding with, authoritarian governments, and he certainly does not care about standing up for the weak or for democratic values. I don’t know why he would personally care about Taiwan. It just doesn’t seem to be in his nature.
It is quite possible that Taiwan becomes some bargaining chip in a broader deal with China, which given the savvy of the Chinese side, may focus on enriching Trump himself and those around him rather than actually helping the American people. There is evidence Trump received millions of direct or indirect payments from foreign governments in his first term in office, and this time around he launched a cryptocurrency meme coin just days before returning to office—a perfect vehicle for untraceable bribes. China could easily just pay Trump directly in exchange for a wink-wink nod-nod on Taiwan.
Signaling matters in the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship, and we should also be worried that the Trump administration may inadvertently send mixed signals. The State Department and DOD seem to be geared up for renewed competition with China, but Trump, Musk and others near the White House might not be. Beijing may get one signal from Trump, and another from Congress, or Rubio and Hegseth, leading to a particularly dangerous situation.
In any case, if Beijing calculates that Trump lacks the resolve to defend Taiwan, it may prompt China to make a move in the next four years, and likely sooner rather than later. That’s why Ukraine matters; it signals to China that the U.S. no longer really cares about these sorts of allies and commitments.
That’s all for today. Thanks as always for reading my work and supporting this newsletter. Please share with friends if you found it useful. I do plan on writing hopeful next week, as I am more optimistic about democracy in this country than I was four weeks ago. So until then.
Best,
Rory
Further Reading/Listening on Taiwan
For a primer on cross-strait relations, I would recommend this report from the Congressional Research Service.
For those looking for a nice statement of the case for Taiwan, I would encourage you to watch Invisible Nation. We had
and her husband out for a screening at Princeton last year, and it was a really illuminating film.For a more lengthy treatment of this topic, you can’t beat this book by Ryan Hass, Bonnie Glaser, and Richard Bush.
Here’s an important Foreign Affairs piece about why reassuring Beijing matters, and how that must be balanced with military deterrence.
An old Sinica episode featuring
and Shelley Rigger, who is one of our country’s most thoughtful Taiwan experts.Another short explainer from Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on China’s foreign relations.
I enjoyed this breakdown of the different thought camps in the Republican national security establishment from fellow Substacker
.
Interesting analysis. It's hard to imagine how worrying all this must be for ordinary Taiwanese. Let's hope for the best.
I am darkly curious as to how the Epoch media ecosystem would react were Trump to start turning on Taiwan. I suspect they'd fall in line because the cost of breaking from Trumpism is so high, though Chinese-language readership would probably suffer.